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United States  
Department of Defense



Performance Framework and Better Management of  
Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense  
Advisors Program

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

CEW	Civilian Expeditionary Workforce
DCOM-A	Deputy Commander-Army
DCOM-P	Deputy Commander-Police
MoDA	Ministry of Defense Advisors



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October 23, 2012

**MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS  
COMMANDER, U.S. COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION  
COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN**

**SUBJECT:** Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed  
for the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program  
(Report No. DODIG-2013-005)

We are providing this report for review and comment. In 2009, DoD developed the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) pilot program to support a pool of civilians capable of building ministerial capacity in Afghanistan. However, MoDA program officials did not establish a performance management framework to include goals, objectives, and performance indicators necessary for assessing the effectiveness of the program. Additionally, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan officials did not use all DoD civilians as advisors with Afghan ministry officials. We considered comments on the draft report when preparing the final report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations conformed to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3 and left no unresolved issues. However, comments from the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan were only partially responsive. Therefore, we request additional comments on Recommendation B.1 by November 22, 2012.

If possible, send a portable document format (.pdf) file containing your comments to [audjsao@dodig.mil](mailto:audjsao@dodig.mil). Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-8905 (DSN 664-8905).

Amy J. Frontz  
Principal Assistant Inspector General  
for Auditing

cc:

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict  
Commander, U.S. Central Command

Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan  
Auditor General, Department of the Army



# Results in Brief: Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program

## What We Did

In 2009, DoD developed the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) pilot program to support a pool of civilians capable of building ministerial capacity in Afghanistan. Our audit objective was to determine whether the program met its intended purpose. Specifically, we determined whether MoDA program goals, objectives, and resources were managed effectively and efficiently.

## What We Found

MoDA program officials did not establish a performance management framework to include goals, objectives, and performance indicators to assess progress and measure program results. Instead, program officials relied on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan [the Command] officials to determine whether MoDAs were effectively building ministerial capacity in the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. Also, program officials did not establish goals and objectives to determine whether an adequate number of MoDA positions were filled in a timely manner.

This occurred because program and Command officials did not establish a cooperative agreement to identify roles and responsibilities and communicate and share information. Other contributing factors cited by program officials included an absence of DoD guidance on building ministerial capacity and the tentative nature of a pilot program creating uncertainty of its future. Without a framework, program officials cannot fully assess the effectiveness of the program in

building ministerial capacity or hold individuals accountable for achieving program results.

In addition, Command officials may not have effectively and efficiently managed MoDA resources. Specifically, officials were unable to justify the need for all 97 authorized MoDA positions and placed 5 of 28 MoDAs interviewed into nonadvisory positions with Afghan officials. This occurred because Command officials did not develop criteria to identify and validate MoDA positions. As a result, MoDAs may be unable to fully exchange expertise and build long-term relationships with Afghan ministry officials.

## What We Recommend

Among other recommendations, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations and Command officials should work together to establish a performance management framework and cooperative agreement and develop and implement criteria to identify and validate MoDA positions.

## Management Comments and Our Response

Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations were responsive and no additional comments are necessary. However, comments from the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan were partially responsive and additional comments are required. Please see the recommendations table on the back of this page.

## Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations		A.1, A.2
Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan	B.1	A.2, B.2.a-b

**Please provide comments by November 22, 2012**

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# Introduction

## Objectives

Our objective was to determine whether the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program met its intended purpose. Specifically, we determined whether the program's goals, objectives, and resources were managed effectively and efficiently. This report is one in a series of reports on the MoDA program. An additional report will address whether MoDA program officials have adequate controls over the distribution of funds to other DoD agencies. See the appendix for a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and prior audit coverage related to the audit objective.

## Background

In 2008, senior DoD officials identified a need to develop an internal DoD capacity that provided institutional, ministerial training and advisory support to our partner nations.<sup>1</sup> In anticipation of the growing importance of capacity building, DoD officials developed two complementary pilot programs: the Defense Institution Reform Initiative and MoDA. DoD officials developed the MoDA pilot program to support a pool of civilians capable of building ministerial capacity in Afghanistan. Additional reports will discuss the Defense Institution Reform Initiative program.

## *MoDA Program*

In 2009, DoD officials designed the MoDA program to forge long-term relationships with a partner nation's ministry of defense by matching senior civilians to partner-identified requirements. DoD civilians can forge long-term relationships under the auspices of the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW), which allows civilians to deploy for up to 2 years.<sup>2</sup> The MoDA program also provides temporary backfill funding to the civilian's parent organization<sup>3</sup> to hire temporary replacements.

The MoDA program offers three courses per year, providing civilians with 7 weeks of extensive training. During the course, civilians receive extensive training in an operational environment and obtain instruction on culture, language, advisory skills, personal security, and civilian-military coordination. From FY 2010 to July 2012, DoD officials reported expending about \$18.8 million on training, backfill, and other MoDA program-related costs for five MoDA classes.

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<sup>1</sup> Institutional capacity is the ability to provide security forces with pay, benefits, and equipment, while ministerial capacity is the ability to conduct activities, such as personnel and readiness, acquisition and logistics, and financial management.

<sup>2</sup> The CEW is a subset of DoD civilians organized, ready, trained, cleared, and equipped in a manner that enhances their availability to mobilize and respond urgently to requirements.

<sup>3</sup> For this report, we refer to "DoD parent organization" as the organization that employs the civilian volunteer.

On December 31, 2011, DoD officials received congressional authority through Public Law 112-81, “Nation Defense Authorization Act of FY 2012,” section 1081, “Authority for Assignment of Civilian Employees of the Department of Defense as Advisors to Foreign Ministries of Defense,” to establish a formal program that deploys advisors to other partner nations. Through this authority, Congress required DoD to submit an annual report and the Comptroller General to report on the effectiveness of the program no later than December 30, 2013.

## ***Roles and Responsibilities***

Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, is responsible for providing policy guidance on foreign defense institution building.<sup>4</sup> Within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations is responsible for overseeing the development of DoD institution building capabilities, to include the MoDA program. Within this office, MoDA program officials are responsible for recruiting, hiring, training, and deploying civilians to Afghanistan. As of March 2012, MoDA program officials deployed 83 civilians. Once deployed, civilians work under the direction of the Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan [the Command] and advise officials in both the Afghanistan Ministries of Defense and Interior.

The Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, is responsible for overseeing the Afghan ministerial development and advisory mission.<sup>5</sup> Within the Command, the Deputy Commander-Army (DCOM-A) is responsible for the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and the Deputy Commander-Police (DCOM-P) is responsible for the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior. DCOM-A and DCOM-P officials developed ministerial development plans, which officials stated outline what each ministerial office should accomplish to be considered sustainable and ready to transition from a U.S. to an Afghan-led effort.

## **Review of Internal Controls**

DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control Program (MICP) Procedures,” July 29, 2010, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the controls. We determined that MoDA program officials did not establish a cooperative agreement to identify roles and responsibilities and communicate and share information. We also determined

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<sup>4</sup> Defense Institution Building is a DoD activity that supports the establishment, strengthening, and building of effective, efficient, and accountable national defense institutions within a foreign government.

<sup>5</sup> Military officers, contractors, and DoD civilians conduct the Afghanistan ministerial advising and training mission.

Command officials did not develop and implement written criteria to effectively identify, justify, and validate MoDA positions. We will provide a copy of the report to senior officials responsible for internal controls at the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations and U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.

## **Finding A. Performance Management Framework Needed for Assessing the Effectiveness of the MoDA Program**

MoDA program officials did not establish a performance management framework to include goals, objectives, and performance indicators. Specifically, program officials relied on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan [the Command] officials to establish goals and objectives necessary for determining whether MoDAs were advising Afghan counterparts in an effort to effectively build ministerial capacity. Also, program officials did not establish goals and objectives to determine whether an adequate number of MoDA positions were filled in a timely manner. In addition, program officials did not establish performance indicators to assess progress and measure program results.

This occurred because program and Command officials did not establish a cooperative agreement to identify roles and responsibilities and communicate and share information. MoDA program officials also cited other factors that impeded their ability to develop a performance management framework. These factors included the tentative nature of a pilot program creating uncertainty of the program's future and an absence of DoD guidance for building ministerial capacity. As a result, program officials cannot fully assess the effectiveness of the program in building ministerial capacity in Afghanistan or hold individuals accountable for achieving program results. In addition, program officials may be missing opportunities to improve the program, increase cost effectiveness, or reduce the risk of MoDAs not being used as intended.

### **Elements of a Performance Management Framework**

A performance management framework includes goals, objectives, and performance indicators. Goals define the expected performance level that entities can compare against the actual performance level while objectives are milestones to achieving a program's goals. Performance indicators are values or characteristics used to assess or measure progress and program results over a specified time frame. Collectively, a performance management framework helps to improve decisionmaking by providing comparative data to assess progress toward achieving goals and objectives, measure cost effectiveness, and reduce risks. A performance management framework also provides a means to hold entities accountable for achieving program results.

As an entity develops a performance management framework, stakeholders should be consulted to identify and assess both the environment in which the program operates and external factors that could affect their ability to accomplish the goals and objectives. Both entities should also have a basic understanding of competing demands, limited resources, and how those demands and resources require careful continuous balancing.

## Goals, Objectives, and Performance Indicators Need to Be Established

MoDA program officials did not establish a performance management framework to include goals, objectives, and performance indicators. Although program officials did not establish a performance management framework, officials stated the pilot program had two goals: ensure MoDAs were advising Afghan counterparts in an effort to build ministerial capacity and fill Command positions with qualified individuals in a timely manner.

### ***Goals and Objectives Needed to Determine Whether MoDAs Were Effectively Building Ministerial Capacity***

Program officials relied on Command officials to establish goals and objectives to determine whether MoDAs were advising Afghan counterparts in an effort to effectively build ministerial capacity. Specifically, program officials stated the Command had overall responsibility for the Afghan ministerial development and advising mission for the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. Program officials further stated that MoDAs report directly to Command officials when performing day-to-day operations;

*Without insight into the operational environment and external factors contributing to MoDA advisory efforts, program officials will not be able to determine if the program is meeting its intended purpose.*

therefore, program officials had limited insight into the effectiveness of MoDA advisory efforts. While building ministerial capacity in Afghanistan is part of the Command's mission, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations is responsible for overseeing the development of all DoD

institution building capabilities, to include management oversight of the MoDA program. Without insight into the operational environment and external factors contributing to MoDA advisory efforts, program officials will not be able to determine if the program is meeting its intended purpose.

Program officials should coordinate with Command officials to develop goals and objectives necessary to assess the effectiveness of MoDAs in advising their Afghan counterparts to build ministerial capacity and consider environmental and external factors that could affect their ability to meet those goals and objectives.

### ***Goals and Objectives Needed to Determine Whether Positions Were Adequately Filled in a Timely Manner***

Program officials did not establish goals and objectives to determine if they filled an adequate number of MoDA positions in a timely manner. Specifically, program officials did not establish an expected level of performance for filling positions. Of the five MoDA classes, program officials averaged filling less than half of the Command requested positions. See the table on page 6 which shows that a low percentage of MoDA positions were filled through five hiring classes, as of April 2012.

**Table. Percentage of Command Requested Positions Filled by Class**

	<b>Command Requested Positions</b>	<b>MoDAs Deployed</b>	<b>Percent of Positions Filled</b>
<b>Class I</b>	20	17	85
<b>Class II</b>	30	16	53
<b>Class III</b>	51	25	49
<b>Class IV</b>	51	17	33
<b>Class V</b>	31	8	26
<b>Total</b>	183	83	45

Program officials stated the average percentage of positions offered to applicants was much higher. However, the percentage of positions filled was lower because of external factors, such as Command officials changing requirements or applicants being medically disqualified, withdrawing for personal reasons, or accepting other employment opportunities. Program officials attributed the difference to challenges associated with deploying an all-volunteer civilian workforce.

Program officials also did not establish an expected level of performance for filling MoDAs positions in a timely manner. For example, program officials had a 6 to 8-month lead time from receipt of the Command requested position to deployment for MoDA classes I through V. While MoDA program officials stated an 8-month lead time could be established as a program standard, Command officials stated the process to fill a MoDA position is too lengthy. Specifically, Command officials stated the type of MoDA positions can change frequently in a contingency environment while waiting for program officials to fill MoDA positions. This factor can lead to MoDAs being reassigned to another position once deployed because the position they were hired for no longer exists.

Program officials should coordinate with Command officials to develop goals and objectives for adequately filling Command positions in a timely manner and consider environmental and external factors that could affect their ability to meet those goals and objectives.

### ***Performance Indicators Needed to Assess and Measure Progress and Outcomes***

MoDA program officials did not establish performance indicators to assess and measure progress and program results. Specifically, program officials did not establish performance indicators, such as the number of hours MoDAs spent advising Afghan counterparts to assess progress toward building ministerial capacity. While program officials began collecting data on the number of hours MoDAs spent advising their Afghan counterparts in November 2011, the monthly reports were not mandatory and, therefore, not all MoDAs provided reports. For example, program officials received monthly reports from 30 of the 57 deployed MoDAs in January 2012.

Program officials also did not establish performance indicators, such as total personnel

*While program officials are not responsible for funding Schedule A personnel, providing all relevant cost data is necessary to assess the cost effectiveness of the program over a specified time frame to make informed decisions.*

costs to measure the cost effectiveness of the program. Specifically, program officials provided personnel costs for MoDAs hired and funded through the program; however, program officials did not provide personnel costs for MoDAs funded through U.S. Army

Central Command. From FY 2010 through July 2012, program officials reported expending about \$18.8 million for training, premium pay, backfill, and other program-related costs. However, program officials did not consider external factors, such as the estimated costs of \$13.9 million for MoDAs hired and funded through the U.S. Army Central Command Schedule A program.<sup>6</sup> While program officials are not responsible for funding Schedule A personnel, providing all relevant cost data is necessary to assess the cost effectiveness of the program over a specified time frame to make informed decisions.

Program officials should coordinate with Command officials to establish performance indicators, such as the number of hours advising and total program costs, to assess and measure progress and program results.

## **Cooperative Agreement Needed Between Program and Command Officials**

MoDA program and Command officials did not establish an agreement to identify applicable roles and responsibilities and ensure cooperation. Before November 2011, both program officials and MoDAs reported communication and information sharing challenges with Command officials. Specifically, Command officials required MoDAs to obtain approval before sharing information on advisory efforts with program officials. This requirement often limited the type and amount of information program officials could receive on MoDAs advisory efforts.

In November 2011, communication and information sharing between program and Command officials improved through conducting biweekly meetings and receiving monthly reports. During biweekly meetings, Command officials stated they coordinated with program officials to plan for upcoming recruiting and hiring efforts and resolve administrative issues. Program officials also received MoDA monthly reports, which included information on the individual's position, number of hours spent advising Afghan counterparts, and significant achievements.

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<sup>6</sup> Through the Schedule A program, U.S. Army Central Command officials hire retired annuitants and non-DoD employees to deploy in support of the MoDA program. U.S. Army Central Command personnel estimated costs from FY10 through April 2012.

While the voluntary monthly reports provide program officials with some visibility into advisory efforts, program officials were unable to take action when MoDAs are not advising. For example, in January 2012, program officials identified two advisors not having an Afghan counterpart assigned and another with no contact with ministry officials. Program officials stated they did not communicate their concerns with Command officials over the use of MoDAs because MoDAs are under the operational control of the Command. While MoDAs are under the operational control of the Command once deployed, program officials should have a mechanism in place to communicate those concerns. The overall success of the MoDA program is dependent upon both program and Command officials communicating and sharing information on advisory efforts to build ministerial capacity and the most effective use of MoDA resources. Without a formal agreement to hold both program and Command officials accountable for ensuring cooperation, DoD is at an increased risk that the MoDA program may not be effective.

Program and Command officials should establish a formal agreement establishing roles and responsibilities to hold individuals accountable for communicating and sharing information to include the type of information, mechanism, and time frame for reporting.

## **Program Officials Also Cited External Factors as Challenges to Developing a Framework**

MoDA program officials cited other external factors that impeded their ability to develop a performance management framework. These external factors included the tentative nature of a pilot program creating uncertainty of the program's future and the absence of DoD guidance on building ministerial capacity.

Program officials cited uncertainty of the pilot program's future as a factor in developing a performance management framework. Specifically, program officials were uncertain whether Congress would provide permanent authority for the program. On December 31, 2011, Congress granted approval through Public Law 112-81 for DoD to establish the MoDA program globally in support of building foreign defense ministries. However, this authority expires on September 30, 2014.

DoD also did not establish formal policy and procedures for building ministerial capacity. As of June 2012, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy were drafting policy for developing and maintaining DoD capabilities to assess, support, develop, and advise partner nations. Once finalized, officials stated they also plan to develop implementation guidance. Our report on the Defense Institution Reform Initiative will address the recommendation for DoD officials to establish policy and procedures.

## **Framework Needed to Fully Assess Program Effectiveness in Building Ministerial Capacity**

Without a performance management framework, program officials cannot fully assess the effectiveness of the MoDA program in building ministerial capacity or hold individuals



accountable for achieving program results. Program officials may also be missing opportunities to improve program results, increase cost effectiveness, or reduce the risk of the Command not using MoDAs as intended. For example, program officials could improve program results by filling MoDA positions in an efficient manner and reducing the risk that a loss in continuity or ineffective transition may occur among MoDAs working to build ministerial capacity. MoDA program officials could also improve decisionmaking by obtaining total program costs and identifying ways to increase the cost effectiveness of the program.

## **Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response**

### ***Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations Comments***

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations stated the findings and recommendations will be very useful to his office, the Command, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency when developing new methods to improve support for the MoDA program in Afghanistan.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense highlighted several observations in the report including the MoDA program being launched as a pilot program in 2010 and the “supply” and “demand” division of his labor between his office and the Command. While he considered those observations to be correctly noted, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense stated the report understated the quality of that arrangement in terms of program management duties. Specifically, the Command, responsible for overseeing the ministerial development and advising mission in Afghanistan, is in the best position to establish MoDA program goals and objectives related to advising activities and the Command implemented a framework through the ministerial development board assessment process. The MoDA program office does not validate Command advisor requirements nor do they oversee the advisors day-to-day work. Instead, their primary objective is to fill every Command required position by training and deploying advisors and providing administrative support to those advisors once deployed. For these reasons, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense did not develop a separate framework to determine whether the MoDAs are effectively building ministerial capacity.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense also stated the report understates the external challenges associated with deploying volunteer civilian advisors and how those challenges impede fill rates for MoDA positions. He further stated the 6 to 8 month recruiting-to-deployment timeline cannot be curtailed unless essential training requirements are scaled back. However, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense stated the MoDA program office will work closely with Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which will assume program management responsibilities for MoDA in FY 2013, and the Command on developing new ways to measure advisor recruiting, training, and deployment performance.

## ***Our Response***

We disagree with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations comments that the Command is in the best position to develop a performance management framework and assess whether MoDAs are effectively building ministerial capacity. While the Command has developed a ministerial development board assessment process, the process is intended to measure the ability of offices within the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to function independently of coalition support. We agree the ministerial development board assessment process can provide insight into the effectiveness of the Command's overall advising effort; however, MoDAs are only a portion of the Command's overall advising efforts. Therefore, the process may not provide the necessary data to assess the effectiveness of the MoDA program in building institutional capacity.

As stated on report page five, we agree program officials are not responsible for the day-to-day operations of deployed MoDAs. However, as stated on report page two, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations is responsible for overseeing the development of all DoD institution building capabilities including management oversight of the MoDA program. While the Command is responsible for building institutional capacity in Afghanistan, program officials and the entity responsible for overseeing the MoDA program should assess MoDAs and the effectiveness of the program to build institutional capacity.

We disagree with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense's comments that the report understates the external challenges associated with deploying volunteer civilian advisors. On report page six, we acknowledge external challenges that could impede fill rates for MoDA positions. Those external factors include Command officials changing requirements or applicants being medically disqualified, withdrawing for personal reasons, or accepting other employment opportunities.

We also disagree with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense comments that the 6 to 8 month recruiting-to-deployment timeline cannot be curtailed unless essential training requirements are scaled back. MoDA program officials deploy DoD civilians under the auspice of CEW, which allows for a subset of DoD civilians to be organized, trained, and equipped in a manner that enhances their ability to mobilize and respond urgently to operational requirements. MoDA program officials could work with Command officials to identify positions, in advance, for advisors due to redeploy, which could reduce the amount of time required from recruiting to deployment and would not impact essential training requirements.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

**A.1. We recommend the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, develop a performance management framework to include goals, objectives, and performance indicators to**

**assess progress and measure program results. The performance management framework should also consider environmental and external factors that could affect the goals and objectives from being accomplished.**

### ***Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations Comments***

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, partially agreed with the recommendation. He stated the MoDA program is currently managed in his office; however, management of the program will transfer to Defense Security Cooperation Agency in FY 2013. Further, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense stated his office, the Command, and Defense Security Cooperation Agency are working on a performance management framework to cover MoDA program office responsibilities, including advisor recruiting, training, and deployment performance indicators. In addition, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency will coordinate with the Command to connect the aforementioned performance management framework with the Command's broader ministerial development assessment framework.

### ***Our Response***

Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations were responsive and met the intent of the recommendation. No further comments are required. A performance management framework established by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, in coordination with Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Command, should assist MoDA program officials in gaining insight into the effectiveness of advisor efforts to build institutional capacity in Afghanistan. Also, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense should ensure the performance management framework includes performance indicators to assess progress, measure program results and consider environmental and external factors.

**A.2. We recommend the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations and the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, establish a cooperative agreement that identifies roles and responsibilities to hold individuals accountable for communicating and sharing information to include the type of information, mechanism, and time frame for reporting.**

### ***Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations Comments***

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, agreed with the recommendations. Specifically, he stated the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in preparation for taking over management responsibilities for the MoDA program on October 1, 2012, had already started coordination on a memorandum of agreement with the Command to establish roles, responsibilities, and lines of communication.

## ***U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Comments***

The Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, agreed with the recommendation. He indicated the MoDA program will transfer from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in FY 2013. He stated the Defense Security Cooperation Agency drafted a memorandum of agreement that provides a framework for Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Command to coordinate and manage the MoDA program. The memorandum of agreement identifies both Defense Security Cooperation Agency's and the Command's roles and responsibilities for managing the MoDA program. The memorandum of agreement also addresses the requirement to collectively establish performance objectives for advisors and the Command to provide documentation on feedback sessions with MoDAs. According to the Commander, the agreement addresses the requirements and validation process and establishes timelines for the Command to submit MoDA requirements to the program office. He further stated the agreement identifies five ways for carrying out coordination between the MoDA program office and Command. The Commander stated that on July 29, 2012, the Command agreed with the draft memorandum of agreement and is awaiting the final signed copy.

## ***Our Response***

Comments from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations and the Commander U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan were responsive and no additional comments are required.

## **Finding B. Better Management of MoDA Resources Needed**

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan [the Command] officials may not have effectively and efficiently managed MoDA resources. Specifically, Command officials were unable to provide justification for all 97 authorized MoDA positions. In addition, officials placed 5 of 28 MoDAs we interviewed, into nonadvisory positions with Afghan ministry officials. This occurred because Command officials did not develop and implement written criteria to identify new and validate existing MoDA positions, such as the amount of time spent advising, the position of the Afghan ministry official, and the length of tour required to build long-term relationships. As a result, Command officials may not fully realize some of the intended benefits of the MoDA program. Specifically, MoDAs may not be able to fully exchange expertise and build long-term relationships with Afghan officials to improve ministerial capacity.

### **Command Process to Review Positions and Place MoDAs**

Before each MoDA class, Command officials issue guidance to the Command subcomponents to review and validate MoDA positions within a specified time frame. Subsequently, Command officials review, consolidate, and forward the requested positions to MoDA program officials who initiate recruiting, hiring, and deploying actions. Once deployed, Command officials place MoDAs into positions for which they were hired or reassign MoDAs to other positions to meet emerging requirements.

### **Command Unable to Justify Number of Positions**

Command officials were unable to provide justification for the number of authorized MoDA positions.<sup>7</sup> Between July 2010 and October 2011, Command's authorized number of positions increased from 20 to 97; however, officials could not provide supporting documentation to justify the increase. Instead, officials stated the increase was requested and supported by senior Command officials. In January 2012, Command officials attempted to justify the authorized number of MoDA positions. Specifically, Command officials stated they reviewed all 97 positions and identified positions that were executive in nature as MoDA positions and positions that were not executive as CEW positions. Of the 97 positions, Command officials identified 55 as MoDA positions and 42 that could be redesignated as CEW positions. However, the attempt to justify the number of authorized MoDA positions did not result in a redesignation of those positions by Command officials.

In April 2012, Command officials made a second attempt to justify the 97 MoDA positions. During this process, Command officials stated they used criteria, such as

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<sup>7</sup> The number of positions is authorized in the Secretary of Defense Orders Book.

whether the position required advising an Afghan Colonel or General. Based on the April 2012 review, Command officials stated they plan to designate 82 positions as MoDAs and the remaining 15 positions as CEW. While we commend Command officials for taking action, additional action is needed to formalize the process and improve management of MoDA resources.

## MoDAs Not Placed Into Advisory Positions

Command officials placed five MoDAs into positions that did not require advising Afghan officials within the Ministries of Defense or Interior. Of the five MoDAs,

- Two stated they developed and provided oversight of ministerial development plans, that Command officials stated outline what each ministerial office must accomplish to be considered sustainable and ready to transition from a U.S. to an Afghan-led effort.
- One stated he provided oversight of advisory efforts to include assigning military, contractor, or civilian advisors to Afghan officials within a Ministry.
- One stated he provided oversight of a construction project unrelated to either Ministry.
- One stated he conducted oversight of anti-corruption efforts within both the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

Additional MoDAs reported performing other duties that affected their ability to effectively advise their Afghan counterparts. For example, four advisors stated they

*Four advisors stated they performed as contracting officer representatives on various Afghan training and mentoring contracts, to include contracts for computer and English training.*

performed as contracting officer representatives on various Afghan training and mentoring contracts, to include contracts for computer and English training. Of those four advisors, two reported advising their counterparts less

than 16 of the 150 hours worked every 2 weeks. Although developing ministerial development plans, providing oversight of other advisory efforts and performing contract oversight duties may contribute towards the Command's ministerial development and advising mission, those duties may not be within the intended purpose of the MoDA program.

## Criteria Needed to Identify and Validate MoDA Positions or Program Benefits May Not Be Fully Realized

Command officials did not establish or use written criteria to identify new and validate existing MoDA positions. In February 2012, DCOM-A officials developed draft criteria defining a MoDA position. The draft criteria stated a MoDA shall: (a) be utilized as a senior advisor to an office or function within the Ministry of Defense and supervise all other advisory personnel within that office or function; (b) typically advise a two-star

general officer or civilian equivalent; and (c) be primarily utilized as an advisor. However, as of June 2012, DCOM-A officials did not finalize the criteria.

DCOM-P officials also did not use written criteria to identify new and validate existing MoDA positions. Instead, they relied on a senior DCOM-P official to identify MoDA positions. Until Command officials develop formal criteria, the decision on whether a position has a need for a MoDA is at the discretion of the current official assigned to the task. Further, MoDAs not assigned counterparts or performing primarily nonadvisory duties will be unable to fully exchange expertise with Afghan ministry officials to improve capacity.

On December 21, 2011, the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, issued policy limiting the tour length of all U.S. civilian personnel to 1 year.

*By implementing this policy, Command officials may affect the effectiveness of the MoDA program and limit its ability to build long-term relationships with Afghan ministry officials.*

Although the Commander may grant extensions, the policy states that those instances will be extremely rare. By implementing this policy, Command officials may affect the effectiveness of the MoDA program and limit its ability to build long-term relationships with Afghan

ministry officials. In addition, limiting MoDAs length of tours to 1 year could result in a loss in continuity or ineffective transition among advisors, which will be even more imperative as the U.S. military begins its drawdown efforts.

When developing written criteria for identifying and validating MoDA positions, Command officials should coordinate with program officials to consider the amount of time spent advising, the position of the Afghan ministry official, and the length of tour necessary to build long-term relationships. Once established, Command officials should use the criteria to justify the number of MoDA positions required. Command officials should also review deployed MoDA roles and responsibilities and make the necessary adjustments to those responsibilities or reassign the personnel to other MoDA positions.

## **Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

**B.1. We recommend the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program officials, develop written criteria for identifying new and validating existing Ministry of Defense Advisor positions. At a minimum, the criteria should include identifying which Afghan ministry officials need advisors, the minimum amount of time a Ministry of Defense Advisor will spend advising, and consider the length of tour necessary to build long-term relationships.**

## ***U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Comments***

The Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, partially agreed with the recommendation. He stated the Command uses guidance provided in the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act as well as Ministerial Development Plans to establish the criteria for a MoDA. The Commander stated he did not agree that the average amount of time an advisor spends advising the Afghan ministry official should be included in the criteria. He stated that a MoDA's primary role and responsibility is to serve as an advisor to the Afghans. The Commander explained that MoDAs also spend time preparing to advise the Afghan ministry official and serving as valuable advisors to other mentors and coalition partners. He further stated each Afghan ministry official is different in the amount of time they are available to spend with advisors. The Commander stated that attempting to determine the average amount of time a MoDA should spend advising the Afghan ministry official is not feasible nor does it provide an accurate measurement of the advisor's success. He also stated the current Command policy is that military and civilian personnel serve 1-year tours. There are exceptions to the policy, which are considered on a case-by-case basis.

### ***Our Response***

Comments from the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan were partially responsive. We acknowledge that there are a number of factors that affect the amount of time a MoDA can spend advising their Afghan counterpart. However, the intent of the MoDA program is to build institutional and ministerial level capacity by building long-term relationships with Afghan counterparts. With this in mind, it is essential that the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, establish guidelines that consider the minimum amount of time a MoDA should be expected to spend advising Afghan ministry officials. Also, these guidelines will assist the Commander in establishing expectations for the amount of time MoDAs should dedicate to executing their primary role. Moreover, the time spent advising, preparing to advise the Afghan ministry official, and serving as valuable advisors to other mentors and coalition partners should be directly related to building institutional and ministerial level capacity. We clarified the wording in the recommendation and request the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, provide additional comments to the final report.

### **B.2. We recommend the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, using the criteria developed in Recommendation B.1:**

**a. Validate all Ministry of Defense Advisors positions authorized and redesignate those positions determined to not be in compliance with the criteria.**

## ***U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Comments***

The Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, agreed with the recommendation. Specifically, he stated that North Atlantic Treaty Organization



Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan initiated steps to validate all MoDA positions and redesignate those positions that did not meet the criteria defined in the National Defense Authorization Act. He stated Command officials met on August 8, 2012, to discuss and establish the criteria that should be used when designating MoDA positions. The Commander stated that based on the review and application of the criteria, the Command identified 92 Joint Manning Document positions to be designated as MoDA positions. He stated the 92 positions recently identified will be used as the annual advisor requirements. Further, the package is being staffed for his approval and will include impact statements for each position. Once approved, the established requirements may be reviewed and adjusted three times annually in accordance with the MoDAs program cycle.

### ***Our Response***

Comments from the Commander U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan were responsive and no additional comments are required.

**b. Review Ministry of Defense Advisor's duties and make the necessary adjustments to those duties or reassign personnel to other Ministry of Defense Advisors positions.**

### ***U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Comments***

The Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, agreed with the recommendation. Specifically, he stated North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan reviewed all MoDA positions to ensure duties are in line with the criteria defined in the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act and that MoDAs are assigned an Afghan counterpart. The Commander stated the review revealed that some positions would be better characterized as staff officer rather than advisor. He stated the Command redesignated those positions as CEW and those serving under the MoDA program in those billets have since redeployed.

### ***Our Response***

Comments from the Commander U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan were responsive and no additional comments are required.

## Appendix. Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 through August 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To accomplish our audit objective, we coordinated with or interviewed officials from the MoDA program, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and U.S. Army Central Command. We obtained and reviewed Public Law 112-81, “Nation Defense Authorization Act of FY 2012,” December 31, 2011; Public Law 111-352, “Government Performance Results Modernization Act 2010,” January 4, 2011; and DoD Directive 1404.10 “Civilian Expeditionary Workforce,” January 23, 2009. We also reviewed MoDA program draft standard operating procedures, DoD defense institution building draft policy, program cost and budget data, deployed MoDA personnel monthly status reports, Command requests for MoDA positions, and supporting documents for establishing the MoDA program.

We coordinated with and interviewed officials from Command CJ1 Human Resources Directorate, CJ38 Joint Manning Requirements Directorate, CJ5 Plans and Operations Directorate, Security Assistance Office, DCOM-A, and DCOM-P to determine how Command officials managed MoDA program resources and identified 97 authorized MoDA positions. In addition, we obtained and reviewed Command draft MoDA personnel requirements generation criteria, Command Fragmentary Orders, CJ1 Human Resources Directorate MoDA personnel management documents, and Command Joint Manning Documents.

As of March 2012, the MoDA program deployed 83 advisors in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan mission. We interviewed 28 of 57 MoDAs at Camp Eggers, Afghanistan in January 2012. Specifically, we selected MoDAs by using data from January 2012 monthly status reports. We divided the reports into three groups:

- Group 1: Individuals that reported advising 25 hours or more a week in January 2012;
- Group 2: Individuals who reported advising 24 hours or less a week in January 2012; and
- Group 3: Individuals who did not submit monthly reports or did not submit a number for hours worked with a counterpart in January 2012.

Our non-sample contained 27 deployed MoDAs or nine individuals from each group. Upon request from a senior MoDA, we granted an additional interview bringing the total

number for group 3 to 10 and total interviews to 28. We used a standard set of questions for each interview and reviewed supporting documents.

Upon completing our initial fieldwork, we coordinated with MoDA program and Command officials to address concerns we observed during our audit. To validate factual accuracy, we also provided a discussion draft to DoD officials discussed in the report.

## **Use of Computer-Processed Data**

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

## **Prior Coverage**

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG), Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, and Inspector General for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) issued six reports on building ministerial capacity. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports>. Unrestricted SIGIR reports can be accessed at [www.sigar.mil/audits/reports.html](http://www.sigar.mil/audits/reports.html). Unrestricted USAID IG reports can be accessed at [www.usaid.gov/oig/public](http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public).

### **GAO**

GAO-12-556 Audit Report, “Security Force Assistance. Additional Actions Needed to Guide Geographic Combatant Commands and Service Effort,” May 10, 2012

GAO Audit Report-11-907, “Afghanistan Governance Performance-Data Gaps Hinder Overall Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Build Financial Management Capacity,” September 20, 2010

GAO-Audit Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq - U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007

### **DOD IG**

SPO-2011-003, “Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Train, Equip, and Mentor the Expanded Afghan National Police,” March 3, 2011

### **SIGIR**

SIGIR Audit Report 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007

### **USAID IG**

USAID Report No. F-306-11-001-S, “Review of USAID/Afghanistan’s Ministerial Assessment Process,” November 6, 2010

# Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations Comments



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2500 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

AUG 31 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT AND SOUTHWEST ASIA OPERATIONS,  
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Response to Draft Audit Report, "Performance Framework and Better Management  
of Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program"  
(Project No. D2012-D000JB-0093.000)

This memorandum responds to recommendations made to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations in the subject report. The findings and recommendations provided by this audit will be very useful as my office, in partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), develops new methods to improve management coordination in support of the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program in Afghanistan. In this regard, several observations are worth highlighting.

First, as the report points out, MoDA is a pilot program. Launched in 2010, its overriding goal is to assist Afghanistan's security ministries in strengthening their institutional competencies in key functional areas such as planning, programming, budgeting, logistics and personnel management. Given the spike in demand for ministerial-level capacity-building as the Afghans increasingly take on full responsibility for their country's security while also sustaining their forces' tactical-level proficiencies, MoDA's methods for recruiting, training and deploying technically proficient advisors had to be developed simultaneously with on-the-ground procedures for determining how best to utilize advisors and assess their performance and overall impact. The resulting division of labor that my office and NTM-A/CSTC-A developed to cover both the "supply" and "demand" sides of the advisory mission is correctly noted in the report, as is the value of enhanced information-sharing. That said, the report understates the inevitable "supported/supporting" quality of this arrangement in terms of program management duties.

Specifically, as the lead for overseeing the ministerial development and advising mission in Afghanistan, NTM-A/CSTC-A is in the best position to establish MoDA program goals and objectives relating to advising activities. My office supports that broader mission by filling NTM-A/CSTC-A advisory requirements with trained DoD civilians—a mission reinforced by a September 19, 2011 memorandum from then-Secretary of Defense Gates encouraging DoD components to "place a high priority on filling civilian requirements in Afghanistan." Thus, the MoDA program office's primary objective is to fill every NTM-A/CSTC-A MoDA requirement by training and deploying advisors and providing administrative

support to those advisors while they are deployed. My office is not in a position to validate NTM-A/CSTC-A advisor requirements; nor can it oversee the day-to-day work of the MoDA advisors.

It is for these reasons that the MoDA program team has not developed a separate performance framework to determine whether the MoDA advisors are effectively building ministerial capacity. NTM-A/CSTC-A is in the best position to do that, and it has innovated an assessment framework to measure institutional capacity: the Ministerial Development Board assessment process. This framework evaluates progress made by the different offices of the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, and measures the overarching advisory effort, which includes the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program, and contractors.

Consistent with the report's recommendations, the MoDA program office will work closely with DSCA (which will be assuming program management responsibilities for MoDA in FY13) and NTM-A/ CSTC-A on developing new ways to measure advisor recruiting, training, and deployment performance. A major question will be how best to capture and evaluate external influences on time-compressed processes. The report understates the external challenges associated with deploying volunteer civilian advisors (e.g., personnel safety, medical disqualifications, etc.) and how those challenges impede fill-rates for MoDA positions. Likewise, the six to eight month recruiting-to-deployment timeline cannot be curtailed unless essential training requirements are scaled back.

To summarize, the audit report's central recommendations and our responses are as follows:

**Recommendation A.1, Page 9, states:**

"We recommend the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, develop a performance management framework to include goals, objectives, and performance indicators to assess progress and measure program results. The performance management framework should also consider environmental and external factors that could affect the goals and objectives from being accomplished."

**PSO Response A.1:**


Partially concur. The MoDA program is currently managed by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (ODASD(PSO)). As noted above, management of the MoDA program will transfer to DSCA in FY13. ODASD(PSO), NTM-A/CSTC-A, and DSCA are working on a performance management framework to cover MoDA program office responsibilities, including advisor recruiting, training, and deployment performance indicators. ODASD(PSO) and DSCA will coordinate with NTM-A/CSTC-A to connect this performance management framework with the broader NTM-A/CSTC-A ministerial development assessment framework.

**Recommendation A.2, Page 9, states:**

“We recommend the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations and the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, establish a cooperative agreement that identifies roles and responsibilities to hold individuals accountable for communicating and sharing information to include the type of information, mechanism, and time frame for reporting.”

**Response A.2:**

Concur. DSCA, in preparation for taking over management responsibilities for the MoDA program on October 1, 2012, has already started coordination on a memorandum of agreement with NTM-A/CSTC-A to establish roles, responsibilities, and lines of communication.



James A. Schear  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations



# U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Comments



HEADQUARTERS  
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN  
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

13 SEP 2012

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CG

MEMORANDUM THRU

United States Forces - Afghanistan (CJIG), APO AE 09356  
United States Central Command (CCIG), MacDill AFB, FL 33621

FOR Office of the Department of Defense – Inspector General, 4800 Mark Center Drive,  
Alexandria, VA 22350-1500

SUBJECT: NTM-A/CSTC-A Response to the Draft Report "Performance Framework and Better  
Management of Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program" (D2012-  
D000JB-0093.000)

1. REFERENCE: Draft Report, dated 9 Aug 2012, Department of Defense Inspector General.
2. Enclosed is NTM-A/CSTC-A's response to Recommendations A. 2, B.1, B.2.a-b within the  
referenced DoD IG draft report.
3. Point of contact for this action is [REDACTED]

Encl

  
DANIEL P. BOLGER 16 Sep 12  
Lieutenant General, US Army  
Commanding

Enclosure not  
included in report

## DRAFT REPORT

“Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense  
Advisors Program” (D2012-D000JB-0093.000)

### NTM-A/CSTC-A GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

1. Recommendation A.2, Page 9, states:

We recommend the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations and the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, establish a cooperative agreement that identifies roles and responsibilities to hold individuals accountable for communicating and sharing information to include the type of information, mechanism, and time frame for reporting.

*a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response:*

Concur. The Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program will transfer from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA), effective 1 October 2012. DCSA drafted a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) (Atch 1) that provides a framework for DCSA and NTM-A/CSTC-A to coordinate and manage the MoDA program. NTM-A/CSTC-A concurred with draft MOA on 29 July 2012, and is awaiting final signed copy. Specifically, the MOA identifies both DCSA's and NTM-A/CSTC-A's roles and responsibilities for managing the program. The MOA addresses the requirement to collectively establish performance objectives for advisors and NTM-A/CSTC-A to provide documentation of the feedback sessions with MoDAs. Additionally, the MOA addresses the requirements and validation process and establishes timelines for NTM-A/CSTC-A to submit the Command's MoDA requirements to the program office. Further, the MOA identifies five ways in which coordination between the MoDA program office and NTM-A/CSTC-A will be carried out.

Attachment 1 is not  
included in report

2. Recommendation B.1, Page 12, states:

We recommend the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program officials, develop written criteria for identifying new and validating existing Ministry of Defense Advisor positions. At a minimum, the criteria should include the average amount of time a Ministry of Defense Advisor will spend advising and the position of the Afghan ministry official and consider the length of tour necessary to build long-term relationships.

*a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response:*

Partially concur. NTM-A/CSTC-A uses guidance provided in the FY12 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) as well as Ministerial Development Plans (MDPs) to establish the criteria for a Ministry of Defense Advisor. The FY12 NDAA addresses the roles and intent of advisors: Department of Defense employees serve as advisors to the ministries of defense to (1) provide institutional, ministerial-level advice, and other training to personnel of the ministry to which assigned in support of stabilization or post-conflict activities; or (2) assist such ministry in building core institutional capacity, competencies, and capabilities to manage defense – related processes. This definition is the overarching guidance used when determining the number of advisors required and validating said positions. Additionally, the Command's MDPs which outline goals, objectives and milestones along a capability milestone continuum, are used to ensure advisors are assigned to a MPD and help lead the Afghan's to self-sufficiency by the end of 2014.



## DRAFT REPORT

“Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense  
Advisors Program” (D2012-D000JB-0093.000)

### NTM-A/CSTC-A GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT

We do not concur with the recommendation that the average amount of time an advisor spends advising the Afghan ministry official should be included in the criteria. The MoDA’s primary role and responsibility is to serve as an advisor to the Afghans. However, they also spend time preparing to advise the Afghan ministry official and serving as valuable advisors to other mentors and coalition partners. This collaboration between MoDAs and other mentors or advisors directly aids in shaping all NTM-A/CSTC-A advising activities as a cohesive team and benefits the overall advising mission of building institutional capacity. Additionally, each Afghan ministry official is different in how much time he is available to spend with advisors. Trying to determine the average amount of time a MoDA should spend advising the Afghan ministry official is not feasible nor does it provide an accurate measurement of the advisor’s success.

The current NTM-A/CSTC-A policy is that military and personnel serve 1-year tours. There are exceptions to the policy which are considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Recommendation B.2.a, Page 13, states:

We recommend the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, using the criteria developed in Recommendation B.1 (above):

a. Validate all Ministry of Defense Advisors positions authorized and redesignate those positions determined to not be in compliance with the criteria.

*a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response:*

Concur. NTM-A/CSTC-A has taken steps to validate all MoDA positions and redesignate those positions that did not meet the criteria defined in the NDAA. On 8 Aug 12, the Senior Advisors, and other representatives from DCOM-P (MoI) and DCOM-A (MoD), as well as representatives from DCG-OPS, CJ38, and CJ1, met to discuss and establish the criteria that should be used when designating positions as MoDA. Subsequently, a suspense was set for 15 Aug 12, to review and validate all existing MoDA positions based on the criteria. The suspense also met the MoDA program office’s suspense of submitting our requirements for MoDA Class VIII NLT 15 Aug 12. During the review, Senior Advisors in each DCOM looked holistically at the overall advisor manning, taking into account military and contractor advisors, as well as the status of each MDP to determine how close the Afghans are to obtaining the goal of self-sufficiency by the end of 2014, and where adjustments needed to be made to assist in that goal.

Based on the review and applying the criteria, the Command identified 92 Joint Manning Document (JMD) positions to be designated as MoDA positions (Atch 2). The draft MOA requires NTM-A/CSTC-A to provide annual, Commander NTM-A/CSTC-A approved, civilian advisor requirements. The 92 positions recently identified will be used as the annual advisor requirements. A package is being staffed for COM NTM-A/CSTC-A approval which will include impact statements for each position. With the CG’s approval, established requirements may be reviewed and adjusted three times annually in accordance with the MoDA program cycle.

4. Recommendation B.2.b, Page 13, states:

Attachment 2 is not  
included in report

**DRAFT REPORT**

“Performance Framework and Better Management of Resources Needed for the Ministry of Defense  
Advisors Program” (D2012-D000JB-0093.000)

**NTM-A/CSTC-A**

**GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT**

We recommend the Commander, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, using the criteria developed in Recommendation B.1 (above):

b. Review Ministry of Defense Advisor’s duties and make the necessary adjustments to those duties or reassign personnel to other Ministry of Defense Advisors positions.

*a. NTM-A/CSTC-A response:*

**Concur.** As stated in above in para 3a, NTM-A/CSTC-A reviewed all MoDA positions to ensure duties are in line with the criteria defined in the NDAA and that MoDAs are advising an Afghan counterpart. Our review revealed that some positions would be better characterized as Staff Officer vice Advisor. Thus, the command redesignated these as Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, and those serving under the MoDA program in these billets have since redeployed.

APPROVED BY:



PREPARED BY:





# Inspector General Department of Defense

